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PRIVATE CRIMINAL REACH OF SECURITIES
REGULATION*
THE RECENT case of Llanos v. United States' invites reflection on
the long reach of the federal criminal law into transactions involving
promissory notes. The defendants had devised a scheme whereby they
gave their own promissory notes to obtain money for their own use by
making various false representations about their business connections
and about the use to which the money was to be put. It was held that
these acts amounted to the "sale" of a "security," and the defendants
were convicted, inter alia, of fraud under the Securities Act of 1933.2
There is, of course, nothing novel in the determination that a
promissory note is a "security" 3 for the purpose of the Securities Act
and the state Blue Sky Laws, or that the issuing of such a note is a
"sale." 4 The Llanos case is, however, a strong reminder of the extent
to which the criminal sanctions of the Securities Act may be applicable
to even purely private transactions.
While private transactions are exempt from some provisions of the
Securities Act,5 they are not exempt from those defining and penalizing
*Llanos v. United States, 2o6 F.zd 852 ( 9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct.
310 (-954).
zo6 F.zd 852 (9 th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 310 (1954).
48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 48 STAT. 905 et seq. (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77 a
et seq. (1946). Other counts on which conviction was based were violations of 6z
STAT 763 (194.8), as amended, 63 STAT 94 (1949), .8 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 1952)
(mail fraud) and 6z STAT. 701 (948), 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Supp. 1952) (conspiracy).
For general discussion of the Securities Act see James, The Securities Act of z933, 32
MICH. L. REv. 624 I934).
3"The term 'security' means any note . . . evidence of indebtedness . . . or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" SECURITIES
Acr, 48 STAT. 74 0933), -5 U.s.C. § 7 7b(.) (1946). People v. Leach, xo6 Cal.
App. 442, 290 Pac. 131 (1930) ; Niemeyer v. Dougan, 3V Ga. App. 99, 119 S.E.
544 0913) (promissory note executed before passage of the Georgia Security Law,
held not affected by the subsequent law). Cf. Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.zd 699 ( 9th Cir. 1938) ("shareholder's receipt")l
Cecil B. De Mille Productions v. Woolery, 61 F.2d 45 ( 9th Cir. 1932) (corporation's
assignment of oil royalty interests as security for note evidencing debt, though not
issued to the public). See Note, 87 A.L.R. 42 (1933). For a discussion of the Se-
curities Act as compared with state legislation see Note, 28 CAL. L. REv. 410 (940).
' "The term sale . . . shall include every disposition of . . . a security . . . for
value. . . ." SECURITIES ACT, supra note 3 at § 7 7b( 3). Bogy v. United States, 96
F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 6o8 (1938).
'SECURITIES ACT, 48 STAT. 74, 77 (1933), as amended, 48 STAT. 906, 15 U.S.C.
1954] NOTES
fraud." True, most criminal prosecutions under these provisions have
involved dealings with the public,' but that feature is not an essential
element of the statutory crime. Rather, there must only be a "sale" 8
of a "security," 9 in connection with which there is fraud" and the use
of interstate channels of communication." Further, under the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 19341 and Rule X-ioB-5 3 based thereon, 4
a purchaser as well as a seller 15 may be criminally liable for fraud'
§§ 7 7 d, 77e (1946). Comment, 36 MICH. L. REv. 604. (1938). For a more gen-
eral discussion see Throop and Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securi-
ties 4ct of z933, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 89 (-937).
°SECURITIES Aar, 48 STAT. 84-85 (1933), -5 U.S.C. § 77q (1946) (definition
of fraud), 48 STAT. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77X (1946) (penalties). For a discussion
of fraud provisions see Notes, is B.U.L. 613 (938) i 26 CORNELL L. Q. 33 (94-1).
'E.g., Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. ,t9
(1953) 5 Securities & Exchange Commission v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d
699 ( 9 th Cir. 1938).
3 See note 4 supra.
0 See note 3 supra.
10 It should be noted that the proscribed "fraud" is not the classical common law
fraud which is associated with deceit, but, rather, the malpractices specifically enumer-
ated in the Securities Act: "It shall be unlawful for any person in the sale of any
security by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly ... (I) to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (z) to obtain money or property
by means of any untrue statement of any material fact or any omission to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon the purchaser." SECURITIES ACT, 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q (1946). For a discussion of civil liability, in a close corporation, involving
the foregoing section consult Latty, The dggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of
Shares in .A Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, i8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
505 (953).
"It is also to be noted that even an incidental use of federal channels such as
the mails, Schillmer v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.zd 875 (2d Cir. 1943) or
interstate trains, Moore v. Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), is enough to
bring a case within this federal legislation. For a general discussion of these and
related problems see Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1001-1003, 876-882 (95).
12 48 STAT. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. (946).
"'Rule X-ioB-5, 17 CODE FED. REGS. § 24o.iob-5 (i949). Comment, 32 TEX.
L. REv. 197, 203 (I953).
"1 SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT, 48 STAT. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (i94-6).
"Recall that the Security Act, supra note io, extends criminal liability only
to the seller.
"0 "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility of any national
security exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to
make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
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in connection with a security transaction. Again, the sanction is not
limited to public offerings, but may extend to a purely private deal
between individuals .17
A few illustrations suffice to point out the "private" reach of the
criminal sanctions under this legislation, which is commonly thought
of as dealing only with regulation of publicly held securities.
Example I: A, living in state X, telephones B in state Y, telling
B that he would like to buy B's Blackacre and that he will pay part
in cash and give his note for the balance. A falsely represents that he
is solvent. B conveys Blackacre and receives A's note. Under Section
17(a) of the Securities Act, A is subject to criminal prosecution for this
private transaction, because all the requisite elements are present.
Example II: C, a jeweler, by letter to D, fraudulently represents
that he has a ring for sale which is a genuine diamond. D, living
outside of town, catches an interstate bus into town, and D, falsely
representing his solvency, purchases the ring from C by giving
a negotiable note. It is possible under the Exchange Act and Rule
X-ioB-5 that both C and D would be liable to criminal prosecution in
this private transaction because both have supplied all the requisite
elements, respectively, of the statutory crime.
Thus, it should be apparent that, although the purpose of the Se-
surities Act and of the Securities and Exchange Act was ostensibly the
protection of the "public,""' their language is so broad that many
transactions, not ordinarily thought of as "security transactions," may
unexpectedly come within their purview.
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which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Rule X-ioB-5,
supra note x3. It should be observed that the definition contained in this rule is
almost identical with that contained in the Security Act, 4.8 STAT. 84 (933), 15
U.S.C. § 77q (.946).
17Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. x946); Northern
Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatre Corp., 193 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 195z) (fraudulent
purchase of stock by insiders for resale).
"8Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. II9, 124(953); Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975, 977 (W.D. Pa. x95).
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